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COMMENT
AN EMPLOYER'S REMEDIES AGAINST
INDIVIDUAL UNION MEMBERS FOR
BREACH OF A NO-STRIKE PROVISION
IN A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT*
Most labor contracts contain a no-strike provision as the quid pro
quo of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement requiring final
and binding arbitration of unresolved disputes between the employer
and the union over the agreement.' If individual union members en-

gage in a work stoppage without the authorization of their union, such
a wildcat strike clearly would be a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement's no-strike provision. The employer would then be deprived
of the benefit of his contract and the production and profits of the firm
would be affected. Presumably, the employer would then be entitled to
seek a legal remedy. The range of remedies available to an employer in

such a predicament has been significantly constricted, however, during
recent Supreme Court terms, and most notably by the Court's decision
last year in Comfplete Auto Transit,Inc. v. Reis.2 In Reis, the plaintiff-

employers brought suit under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act 3 seeking damages from individual union members for a
* The author wishes to express her appreciation for the gracious assistance of Lynn Paul
Mattson, Steve Andrew, and Jan Brami in preparing this Comment.
1. Handsaker & Handsaker, Remedies and Penaltiesfor Wildcat Strikes- How Arbitrators
andFederalCourtsHaye Ruled, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 279, 279 (1973). The United States Supreme
Court has held that a no-strike provision can even be implied by the existence of an arbitration
clause. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962). No obligation to
arbitrate a labor dispute arises by operation of law; the law compels a party to submit to arbitration only if he has contracted to do so. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368,
374 (1974).
2. 451 U.S. 401 (1981).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). The statute provides in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
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wildcat strike.4 The issue raised on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court was whether section 301(a) of the Labor Management

a question that had
Relations Act of 19471 authorizes such actions,
6
been expressly reserved by the Supreme Court.

The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, also commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act,7 was passed by Congress to reduce

the large number of strikes in the United States, to strengthen the collective bargaining process, and to rebalance the bargaining power of

employers and unions created by earlier legislation.8 Section 301 was
enacted as a part of the Taft-Hartley Act to ameliorate the concerns
that previous legislation had given unions too much power. 9 Under the

common law prior to 1947, unions were not recognized as legal entities.
The adoption of section 301 remedied this by treating unions as if they

were corporations for purposes of federal court litigation.

°

Consistent

with allowing unions to be sued, section 301(b) prevents money judg-

ments against a union from being collected against individual union
members. I The Taft-Hartley Act, however, does not deal directly with
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect commerce
as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the act of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents
in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in
a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as
an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
4. 451 U.S. at 403.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
6. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249 n.7 (1962) (holding that § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 does not authorize an action against individual union
officers and members when their union is liable for violating a no-strike clause).
7. Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976)).
8. The Wagner Act of 1935, the original form of the present National Labor Relations Act,
which contains provisions derived from the Wagner Act and others added by the Taft-Hartley Act
in 1947, and the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, outlawed only unfair labor practices by employers
which interfere with the employees' freedom to organize and bargain collectively. The Taft-Hartley Act added prohibitions against union conduct. See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN,
LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 81-87 (9th ed. 1981) (discussing the contributions of the TaftHartley Act to national labor policy).
9. Kozub, Wildcat Strikers: IndividualLiability Under Section 301?, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 671,
673 (1980).
10. Id See Cox, Some Aspects ofthe Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L.
RV. 274, 303-04 (1948). The prior common law necessitated service of process on every union
member, Kozub, supra note 9, at 672, which illustrates the imbalance of bargaining power remedied by § 301. The Act also imposed liability on unions for unfair labor practices. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (1976).
1I. See supra note 3.
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the question of whether an employer can recover monetary damages
against individual union members for the actions they take without the
authorization of the union.
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protects employees'
rights to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,"' 2 which protects strikes
conducted by lawful means. A strike in violation of a no-strike promise, however, is unprotected conduct 3 and, as such, contravenes the
basic policy of the Act to provide for industrial peace through the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.' 4 In exchange for a nostrike promise on the part of the employees, a union usually negotiates
for a grievance and arbitration procedure, whereby management bargains away its discretion to a third party.
Federal policy favoring the arbitration of labor disputes as a substitute for industrial strife is firmly grounded in the Labor Management
Relations Act. Section 203(d) provides that the "[f]inal adjustment by
a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."' 5 In
the 1960 Steelworkers trilogy,' 6 the Supreme Court enunciated the now
well established presumption governing a dispute's arbitrability under
a collective bargaining agreement: An order to arbitrate the particular
,,grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of coverage.' 7 The policies favoring arbitration have been construed so broadly that in the absence of contrary language in the contract, the duty to arbitrate extends to a dispute arising even after an
12. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
13. See NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939) (participating employees subject
to discipline, including discharge, for contract breach).
14. A strike that protests serious unfair labor practices of an employer, however, is not a
violation of a no-strike clause. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 284 (1956). See
Arlan's Dep't Store, 133 N.L.R.B. 802, 804 (1961) (strikers are in breach of contract if employer's
unfair labor practices are not serious); NLRB v. Northeast Okla. City Mfg. Co., 631 F.2d 669, 677
(10th Cir. 1980) (serious unfair labor practice excused breach of no-strike clause).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
16. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).

17. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
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agreement's expiration. 8
As the Supreme Court has noted, "[n]o obligation to arbitrate a
labor dispute arises solely by operation of law. The law compels a
party to submit his grievance to arbitration only if he has contracted to
do so.""' An arbitration agreement and a no-strike promise are so
closely linked, however, that the Supreme Court has found that a nostrike obligation can be implied from the existence of an arbitration
provision.2" In sharp contrast to the broad coverage of arbitration, a
right that management has bargained away, stands the no-strike promise of the union and employees, which appears to be a highly devalued
promise in recent terms of the Court, especially since the decision last
term in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis.2
I.

THE FACTS IN REIS

Three employers engaged in the trucking industry brought suit
under section 301(a) against named and unnamed employees seeking
monetary and injunctive relief from the employees' participation in a
strike not authorized by their union, Teamsters Local 332, in violation
of the governing collective bargaining agreement.2 2 All three employers were parties to the same collective bargaining agreement with the
Teamsters Union covering their operations, including those at their
Flint, Michigan facilities. 23 The contract contained both a no-strike
clause and a clause providing for the binding arbitration of grievances.24 On June 8, 1976, the employees of Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. began an unauthorized work stoppage in violation of the contract,
and on June 10, the employees of the other two employers did likewise. 25 These employees believed that "the union was not properly
representing them in current negotiations for amendments to the col18.

Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 255

(1977).
19. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974).

20. Id. at 382.
21. 451 U.S. 401 (1981).
22. 451 U.S. at 402-03.
23. Id. at 403.
24. The no-strike clause states that:
The Unions and the Employers agree that there shall be no strike, tie-up of equipment,
slowdowns or walkouts on the part of the employees, nor shall the Employer use any
method of lockout or legal proceedings without first using all possible means of a settle-

ment as provided for in this Agreement, of any controversy which might arise.
Id. n.l.

25. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss1/3

4

Pyron: An Employer's Remedies against Individual Union Members for Breac
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:110

lective bargaining agreement."2 6

In separate, identical actions, the employers initially sought to enjoin the wildcat strikes, but after consolidation the federal district court
denied that relief, finding that the strikes were not an arbitrable issue.27
The court held that the differences which led to the work stoppage were
between the union members and the union rather than between the

employers and employees. 28 Additionally, the court found that the
strikes had not been authorized by the union.29 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on February 28, 1978.30
On June 16, 1976, the employers renewed their motion for injunctive relief by amending their complaint to state that the local union had
offered to enter into an agreement with the employer by which the
striking employees would return to work in exchange for assurances
that no discipline would be imposed. 31 After additional hearings, the
district court concluded that the work stoppage continued only because
of a dispute between the union and the employers over amnesty from

discipline for the striking employees and that this issue was arbitrable.
The court then issued a preliminary injunction against the employees

and directed the employers to submit to arbitration procedures should
any discipline be imposed. 32 The employees obeyed the injunction for
26. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F.2d 1110, 1111 (6th Cir. 1980).
27. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), requires that certain
conditions be met before a federal court may enjoin a strike due to the prohibition against injunc-

tions in labor disputes contained in § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1976). Those requirements are: (I) that the collective bargaining agreement contain a mandatory
grievance or arbitration procedure; (2) that the collective bargaining agreement give rise to an
obligation on the part of the union not to strike over the subject grievance; (3) that the strike arise
out of the subject grievance; (4) that breaches of the collective bargaining agreement are occurring
and will continue to occur, or that such breaches have been threatened and will be committed;
(5) that irreparable injury has occurred or will occur to the detriment of the employer, and (6) that
the employer would suffer more from denial of the injunction than the union would from its
issuance. See 398 U.S. at 254. See also Note, Boys Markets InjunctionsAgainstEmployers: Lever
Brothers, Inc. v. Chemical Workers Local 217, 91 HARV. L. REv. 715, 719-24 (1978) (analysis of
standards governing an order to arbitrate and a Boys Markets injunction).
Boys Markets overruled this aspect of Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962)
(which held that a suit under § 301 to enjoin a work stoppage was barred by § 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act), and held that § 4 must be viewed in light of the subsequent passage of § 301
because equitable remedies are essential to the peaceful solution of labor disputes. 398 U.S. at
253.
28. Reis, 614 F.2d at 1111.
29. Id. This decision was delivered orally on June 14, 1976, with an order entered on June
21, 1976.
30. Id. This order was not published.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1112. The injunction was issued on June 21, 1976, with no appeal taken from this
order.
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nine months and then, on March 25, 1977, sought to dismiss the entire
consolidated complaint and to dissolve the injunction on the basis that
it was moot.3 3 In response, the plaintiff-employers argued that although the employees had returned to work, the issues of the case were
not moot and that they were not precluded from obtaining damages
from the individual employees for their lengthy breach of the contract's
no-strike provision.3 4
Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,3 5 which held that the issue of a
strike's legality would not support an injunction against it, the district
court denied the injunction on the grounds that the work stoppage was
not precipitated by an arbitrable issue, a finding later reversed by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 36 The Sixth Circuit found that the
strike had been transformed from a nonarbitrable internal dispute to
an arbitrable underlying cause due to the amnesty dispute over the discharged workers, thus entitling the employers to an injunction within
the ambit of Boys Markets.3 7
The district court also dismissed the employers' claim for damages,
holding that "one of the congressional purposes behind enactment of
section 301 of the Labor Act was to shield union members from liability and that this purpose would be undercut if monetary damages were
recoverable by an employer from individual employees."3 The Sixth
Circuit noted that this issue had never been addressed by the United
States Supreme Court and that section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 does not directly deal with the question of
whether the individual members of a union may be sued for damages
resulting from a wildcat strike. 39 Finding that the legislative history
indicates that individual members may not be sued for such damages
under section 301,40 and relying on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretation of section 301 in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 428 U.S. 397, 409 (1976) (the decision was handed down in the midst of the Re/s dispute).
36. 614 F.2d at 1114.
37. Id Buffalo Forge, which held that the issue of a strike's legality, while arbitrable, is not
sufficient to support an injunction in light of the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, was held not
to be dispositive in this case because the underlying cause of the Reis strikes was found to be
broader than merely the strike's legality. Id.
38. 614 F.2d at 1112 (summarizing the proceedings in the district court below).
39. Id. at 1115.
40. Id. Other federal courts have held that neither the text nor the legislative history of§ 301
necessitates immunity for wildcat strikers. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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& Atomic Workers InternationalUnion,4 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the

district court's dismissal of the employers' damages claim.4" The employers then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for reversal
on the damages issue only.43
II.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

The legal issue raised by Reis is one not previously addressed by
the United States Supreme Court. Section 301 was enacted as a part of
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 to grant federal district courts original
jurisdiction over suits for violations of collective bargaining agreements. Both federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction4
under section 301, with state courts applying federal substantive law.
Section 301(b) expressly prevents money judgments against a union
from being collected against individual union members, but does not
address whether an employer can recover monetary damages against
individual union members for their own actions, unauthorized by the
union.4 s
The major impetus underlying the theory of section 301(b) in pro-

tecting individuals from liability for union actions was the notorious
DanburyHatters46 case, decided in 1915, in which union members were
held personally liable for an illegal union-directed boycott that resulted
in severe economic hardship. Prior to the decision in Reis, the lower
federal-courts and other authorities were divided on whether section

301(b) and its legislative history prevented suits against individual
47
union members for monetary relief based on their individual actions.

An employer does have the right to enforce a collective bargaining
agreement by virtue of section 301. This includes the right to sue a
41. 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971). See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
42. 614 F.2d at 1116.
43. 451 U.S. at 405. Review of the Sixth Circuit's ruling on injunctive relief was not sought
by any party and will not be analyzed herein. The reasoning of the Sixth Circuit concerning
monetary relief is discussed in conjunction with the discussion of the Supreme Court's decision.
See infra notes 91-118 and accompanying text.
44. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 514 (1962).
45. See supra note 3.
46. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 284 (1908) (cause of action can be maintained for
union-directed boycott as violation of Sherman Antitrust Act); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522, 535
(1915) (union members' property attached); Loewe v. Savings Bank of Danbury, 236 F. 444, 445
(2d Cir. 1916) (judgment of $252,130 against union satisfied by attachment of individual members'
property), a27'd, 242 U.S. 357 (1917). In these DanburyHatters cases, an antitrust treble damage
action was successfully brought against a large number of union members for the employer's
losses from the union-directed boycott of his hats. See Kozub, supra note 9, at 673.
47. See infra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
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union for breach of a no-strike provision but only if the union "instigated, supported, ratified, or encouraged" the strike. 8 A wildcat strike,

as the term will be used herein, refers to a strike by employees without
union authorization which is in violation of the collective bargaining

agreement,49 thus, by definition, precluding obtaining damages from
the union. It is well settled that section 301(a) confers jurisdiction on

federal courts to decide lawsuits alleging violations of collective bargaining agreements and that it "authorizes federal courts to fashion a
body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining
agreements. 5 °
The Supreme Court has provided guidelines for fashioning this

body of federal law:
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes
some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or
may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in

the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack
express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the
policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will
be determined by the nature of the problem. 1

In Smith v. Evening News Association,52 the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that section 301 does not exclude suits brought by indi-

vidual employees and construed the phrase "between an employer and
a labor organization" to modify "contracts" rather than "suits.

'5 3

The

48. Carbon Fuel v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 216-18 (1979) (upholding the right
to sue only when the union may be found liable under principles of agency in the absence of a
contract clause requiring a higher duty of the union). See also United Steelworkers v. Lorain, 616
F.2d 919, 922 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981) (which held that the union was not
liable even though the contract required the union to discourage and prevent work stoppages
because such a clause did not appear in the damages section of the contract, which limited the
union's liability to stoppages it authorized and encouraged).
49. See Kozub, supra note 9, at 671 n.1.
50. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957). For some years after
its enactment, the scope of§ 301 was interpreted narrowly, limiting it to actions between the parties to the collective bargaining agreement (ie., the employer and the union), thus precluding suits
involving individual employees. See Note, Labor Law-Section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act-Individual Liablilty of Employeesfor an Unauthorized Work Stoppage in Breach of
the No-Strike Clause of a Collective BargainingAgreement, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1657, 1660-61
(1972).
51. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
52. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
53. Id. at 200.
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any
such labor organization, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
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scope of section 301 was thereby broadened since individual claims
often lie at the "heart" of the contractual grievance procedure and are
"intertwined" with the interests of the union. 4 But prior to Reis, the
Court had not taken a clear position on whether an employer may sue
individual employees under section 301. This question was not considered by the Court in Atkinson v. SinclairRefning Co. 5 InAtkinson, the
employer sought to hold the union liable for causing a strike in violation of the no-strike agreement. Furthermore, the employer sought to
hold the individual union members and officials liable for their actions
on behalf of the union.5 6 The Court concluded that section 301 does
not authorize a damages action against individual union officers and
57
members when their union is liable for violating a no-strike clause.
The question of whether an employer may maintain a damages suit
against "individual defendants acting not in behalf of the union but in
their personal and nonunion capacity" when their actions have violated
the no-strike clause was expressly reserved. 8
III.

CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION

301

In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,19 the Supreme Court remarked that section 301 "contemplates suits by and against individual
employees as well as between unions and employers. ' 60 Hines did not
deal with the same issue addressed here, however, so prior to Reis, this
statement could reasonably be viewed as nothing more than an indication of the Court's attitude toward the permissibility of a suit against an
individual employee.6 1
The federal courts were divided on this question before Reis, with
the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits and some district courts disjurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without re-

gard to the citizenship of the parties.
Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
54. 371 U.S. at 200. In Smith, a union member sought to collect wages in the form of dam-

ages from his employer who had refused to permit the plaintiff to report to work during a strike by
another union although he allowed non-union employees to work. Id. at 196.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

370 U.S. 238 (1962).
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id. n.7.
424 U.S. 554 (1976).
Id. at 562.
See Kozub, supra note 9, at 676. In Hines, the plaintiff-employee brought suit against the

employer for wrongful discharge, as opposed to the employer suing the employee for monetary
damages. 424 U.S. at 562.
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missing suits against employees, 62 and a number of other district courts
allowing such suits. 63 In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic
Workers InternationalUnion,64 the employer sought damages from six

individual defendants as representatives of a class of approximately
one thousand employees for breach of a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement.65 The court recognized that section 301
neither expressly authorizes nor expressly prohibits such a cause of action and therefore scrutinized the legislative history to determine congressional intent. 6 The court concluded that section 301 does not
authorize a suit by an employer against an employee for engaging in a
wildcat strike; furthermore, the court noted, section 301 was enacted to
prevent the assessment of damages against individual union
members.67
A different reasoning was applied a few months before the Sinclair
Oil decision by a district court within the Seventh Circuit in a decision
not mentioned in the Sinclair Oil opinion. In Duquoin Packing Co. v.
Local P-156, Amalgamated Meat Cutters,68 a federal district court allowed a suit against individual employees for breach of a no-strike
62. See, e.g., Putnam Fabricating Co. v. Null, 631 F.2d 311, 313 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 983 (1981); United Steelworkers v. Lorain, 616 F.2d 919, 924 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 983 (1981); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 452 F.2d 49,
55 (7th Cir. 1971); Lakeshore Motor Freight Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Steelhaulers
Local No. 800, 483 F. Supp. 1150, 1154 (W.D. Pa. 1979), appealdirmissed, 614 F.2d 772 (3d Cir.
1980); United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Local 8003, 83 LAB. CAS. (CCH)
10,612 (D. Utah Apr. 14, 1978); Benada Aluminum Prod. Co. v. United Steelworkers, 83 LAB.
CAS. (CCH) 10,609 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 1978).
63. See, e.g., Certain-Teed Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 484 F. Supp. 726, 728 (M.D. Pa.
1980); New York State United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677, 683 (N.D.N.Y. 1978);
Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 429 F. Supp. 445, 451 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Duquoin
Packing Co. v. Local P-156, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 321 F. Supp. 1230, 1233 (E.D. Ill. 1971).
64. 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2601 (N.D. Ind. 1969), a}7'd, 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
65. 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2602. The action arose when a group of workers refused to cross
the picket line of another bargaining unit of the same local union which was in the process of
negotiating a new agreement. See Note, supra note 50, at 1657-58.
66. 452 F.2d at 52.
67. Id. at 55. The court did not expressly state that § 301 precludes an employer from bringing a similar action under another theory, although such prohibition seems to be implied from the
court's statement that § 301 does "not authorize" such suits. See Note, supra note 50, at 1663. See
also 6 GA. L. REv. 797, 799-800 (1972) (analysis of Sinclair Oil).
In a recent decision that followed the holding in Sinclair Oil, the Fourth Circuit stated that it
was influenced by the fact "that in some nine years since the Seventh Circuit decided Sinclair Oil,
Congress has not seen fit to take any action to alter the result in that case." Putnam Fabricating
Co. v. Null, 631 F.2d 311, 313 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,451 U.S. 983 (1981). See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 470 F. Supp. 1298, 1299 (W.D. Pa.
1979) (following Sinclair Oil), appealdismissed, 614 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1980).
68. 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Il1. 1971).
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agreement.6 9 In that decision, the court distinguished the DanburyHatters situation, involving a union-authorized breach of contract, from a
situation involving a true wildcat strike.7 0 Similarly, the federal district
court in New York State United Teachers v. Thompson7 stated that to
allow individual conduct to fall outside the scope of section 301 would
leave a gap in the uniform enforcement of that statute. The court thus
concluded that the rights of an employer were not to be accorded a
lesser degree of protection. 2 Thompson involved an educational leave
provision of a collective bargaining agreement that required employees
to return to their jobs for at least the length of their leave, which two
employees violated upon their resignations. Since the two employees
resigned, the court noted that the "usual" remedy of discipline or discharge was not available, but the court reasoned that the employees
should be held liable in damages to their employer for their contract
breach.73
Furthermore, in Alloy CastSteel Co. v. UnitedSteelworkers,74 individual union members were found liable for damages based on the
Supreme Court's language in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. 75
With this background of limited and divided authority and with the
absence of express statutory coverage, in Reis, the Supreme Court resolved the question of an individual's liability for a wildcat strike that
breached a no-strike provision, pursuant to section 301, in favor of the
individual and against the employer.
In interpreting the legislative history of section 301, the petitioners-employers in Reis argued that "[t]he concern of Congress was to
insulate individuals from monetary liability because of actions taken by
'76
labor organizations as demonstrated in the Danbury Hatters cases."
The petitioners contended that the Sixth Circuit failed to distinguish
69. Id. at 1233.
70. Id.
71. 459 F. Supp. 677, 683 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
72. Id. at 683-84.
73. Id. at 679-80, The unavailability of discharge and discipline remedies distinguishes this
case from wildcat strike cases; furthermore, the collective bargaining contract therein required an
employee violating the leave provisions to pay a pro rata share of their leave expense. Kozub,
supra note 9, at 678. The reasoning in Thompson that employees should be liable on their collective bargaining agreement was relied on, however, in Certain-Teed Corp. v. United Steelworkers,
484 F. Supp. 726, 728 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (employer's suit against employees for violating a no-strike
clause upheld), despite its factual differences from wildcat strike cases.
74. 429 F. Supp. 445, 451 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
75. 424 U.S. 554 (1976). See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
significance of Hines.
76. Brief for Petitioners at 8, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981).
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between the factual situation in DanburyHatters and a factual situation
where union members act as individuals and not as agents for their
union. 7 According to the petitioners, in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act,
Congress hoped to achieve the following goals: (1) to reduce the large
number of strikes in the United States; (2) to strengthen the collective
bargaining procedure; (3) to equalize the balance of power between

employers and unions; (4) to provide for the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements; and (5) to eliminate the possibility of holding

individuals liable when the union is responsible for the contractual
breach.7" The petitioners argued, however, that the overriding concern
that existed in Congress was that collective bargaining agreements must

be enforceable and binding upon the parties.7 9 Congress condemned
individual liability, the petitioners contended, only when union members were held responsible for the actions of the union." In interpreting the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, one must

begin with its precursor, the Case bill of 1946,1 which was passed by
77. Id. at 9. As examples of other instances when courts have made similar erroneous interpretations, the petitioners cited Putnam Fabricating Co. v. Null, 631 F.2d 311, 313 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981), and Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. International Union of Elec.
Workers, 470 F. Supp. 1298 (W.D. Pa. 1979), appealdismissed, 614 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1980). Brief
for Petitioners at 9.
78. Brief for Petitioners at 9-10. See 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1976) (statement of general purposes of Taft-Hartley Act); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1947), reprinted in 1
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 292, 29497 (1948); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-3 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 407, 407-09 (1948).
79. Brief for Petitioners at 10-12. See 93 CONG. REC. 3839 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft); 93
CONG. REc. 4410 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
80. Brief for Petitioners at 13. Under such reasoning, § 301 would then apply only to Danbury Hatters cases.
In the "Danbury Hatters" case it will be remembered a judgment was obtained, and
because it was a voluntary organization, the houses of all the various members were
levied on and taken in satisfaction of the judgment. We do not want to perpetuate such a
condition. Therefore, we provide very simply that a labor union may be sued as if it
were a corporation, and if it is sued, then the funds of the labor organization and its
assets are responsible for the judgment, but the funds and the assets of the individual
members are not liable on such a judgment.
92 CONG. REC. 5705 (1946) (remarks of Sen. Taft). See also 93 CONG. REC. 5014 (1947) (remarks
of Sen. Ball) (concerning the DanburyHatters cases); H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 66
(1947), reprintedin 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1135, 1172 (stating that § 301(b) provides
for money judgments against unions to be enforceable "against the organization as an entity and
against its assets and not against any individual member or his assets"); 93 CONG. REc. 6283
(1947) (remarks of Rep. Case) (noting that the objection to DanburyHatters cases is the attachment of property of individual members "to satisfy a judgment for action taken by officers whom
they did not control"); Note, supra note 50, at 1664-66 (summary of legislative history).
81. H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) (vetoed in 1946). See Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 (1962) (held that § 10 of the Case bill was the direct antecedent of
§ 301). Section 10 of the Case bill, as originally introduced in the House of Representatives, reads:
All collective bargaining contracts shall be mutually and equally binding and enforcea-
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both Houses of Congress, but vetoed by the President. 82 The petitioners argued that the Court should not interpret statements made in a
Senate debate on this bill in a vacuum, as the Sixth and Seventh Circuits had allegedly done in finding that discipline was the sole and exclusive remedy intended by Congress, 83 and that congressional debate
focused on strikes for which a union was responsible and not on an
individual's liability for a wildcat strike.8 4

The respondents-employees argued that the Sixth Circuit had correctly interpreted Congress' purpose in insulating individual employees
from a damages action.85 In support of their proposition, the respondents cited the DanburyHatters case and the final form of the Case bill
as passed by the House and the Senate, which included a subsection (d)

in section 10, which provided that employees who participated in unauthorized work stoppages would lose their status as employees under the
National Labor Relations Act.86 The respondents contended that secble either at law or in equity against either of the parties thereto, any other law to the
contrary notwithstanding. In the event of a breach of any such contract or of any agreement contained in such contract by either party thereto, then, in addition to any other
remedy or remedies existing either in law or equity, a suit for damages for such breach or
for injunctive relief in equity may be maintained by the other party or parties in any
United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties. If the defendant against
whom action is sought to be commenced and maintained is a labor organization such
action may be filed in the United States district court of any district wherein any officer
of such labor organization resides or may be found.
H.R. 5262, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
82. For the presidential message vetoing the Case bill and the unsuccessful congressional
attempt to override the veto, see 92 CONG. REC. 6674-78 (1946).
83. Brief for Petitioners at 16-17, Reis. The Seventh Circuit used the following statements
concerning fines by unions against their members as definitive support of discipline as the sole
remedy of § 301. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 452 F.2d
49, 53 (7th Cir. 1971). The full exchange between the Senators reads as follows:
MR. CAPEHART: I believe I am correct in the statement that in many miners' contracts an agreement is contained that if any member of the union pulls a wildcat strike or
a sitdown strike, or refuses to work, he is automatically fined by the union, and I think
the fine has been as high as $6 a day. I think it will be found today that such provisions
are contained in miners' contracts, by which they try to discipline their own members by
fining them $2, or $4, or $6 a day if they refuse to work according to the terms of the
collective bargaining contract.
MR. TAFT: Yes, I think so. Generally, this particular provision has been approved by
the labor people. They feel, and I feel, that a responsible labor leader who wants to keep
his contract should not be hampered by the fact that members of the union whom he
cannot control put on a wildcat strike. Four or five men can tie up an entire plant-and
it has happened repeatedly-if they happen to be in a crucial spot. Those are the men
who ought to be disciplined if they prevent a responsible labor leader from carrying on
his collective bargaining contract.
92 CONG. REC. 5706 (1946).
84. Brief for Petitioners at 16, Reis.
85. Brief for Respondents at 8, Reis.
86. (d) Any employee who participates in a strike or other interference with the performance of an existing collective bargaining agreement, in violation of such agreement,
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tion 10(d) evidenced congressional intent to provide discipline and dis-

charge as the sole remedy for an employer. 87 Furthermore, the
respondents noted that the Court has questioned the advisability of an

employer's use of the money damage remedy even against a union as
an instrument of attaining industrial peace,88 thus such a remedy
should likely be questioned as an action against individuals.

In its amicus curiae brief, the AFL-CIO indicated that while provisions similar to section 10(d) of the Case bill of 1946 were not a part

of the final form of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, the
Conference Committee did so only because of recent NLRB decisions
upholding discharges of wildcat strikers.8 9 Further, the AFL-CIO con-

tended that Congress expressly rejected the creation of a damage remedy against individual employees with the exclusive remedy of

discharge sanctioned for employers. 90
IV.

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN REIS

The Supreme Court prefaced its opinion in Reis with a reference

to the federal courts' authority to fashion a body of federal law for the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, but noted that such
authorization was to be exercised with substantial deference to revealed

congressional intent.9 ' In examining the "penumbra" of section 301(b),
the Court found congressional intent to clearly shield individual em-

ployees from liability for damages arising from their breach of the nostrike clause of a collective bargaining agreement, regardless of
whether the union participated in or authorized the illegality.9 2 "Indeed, Congress intended this result even 93though it might leave the employer unable to recover for his losses."
if such strike or interference is not ratified or approved by the labor organization party to
such agreement and having exclusive bargaining rights with such employee, shall lose his
status as an employee of the employer party to such agreement for the purposes of Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the National Labor Relations Act: Provided, that such loss of status
for such employee shall cease if and when he is re-employed by such employer.
H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
87. Brief for Respondents at 16, Reis.
88. Id. at 30 (citing Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248
(1970)).
89. Brief for Amicus Curiae, AFL-CIO at 27, Reis.
90. Id. at 27-28.
91. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 406 (1981). Justice Brennan delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Stewart, white, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined. Justice Powell concurred in part and in the judgment. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Rehnquist joined.
92. Id. at 407.
93. Id. at 407-08.
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Beginning its review of the legislative history of section 301 with
the Case bill, the Court focused on section 10(d), which explicitly permitted the discharge of a wildcat striker, and cited examples of Congress' "clear" understanding of its limitations of an employer's
remedies.94 Due to the "substantial" similarity between the Case bill
and section 301, the Court found that Congress' intent was to shield
individual employees from liability.95
Six months after the presidential veto of the Case bill, Congress
began work on the legislation that became section 301.96 The House
proposal included a provision imposing damages liability on individuals for unlawful concerted activity which was defined to include,
among other things, jurisdictional and sympathy strikes, but not wildcat strikes; the Court noted that this proposal was rejected by the Senate in its version and that a Joint Committee adopted the Senate
version. 97 Furthermore, the Court noted that the Joint Committee deleted the proposal of the House version of section 301 that dealt with
the right to discharge wildcat strikers, as it was deemed no longer necessary in light of recent NLRB decisions.98 The Court concluded that
the penumbra of section 301(b) and its legislative history indicate a
congressional "preference" for discharge of a wildcat striker, with its
94. Id. at 410. The principal proponent, Senator Taft, explained:

If the union violates its collective bargaining agreement, it is responsible but no individual member is responsible, and he can in no way be deprived of his rights. But if the
union tries to keep its contract, and, in violation of its undertaking, some of its members
proceed to strike, then the employer may fire those members and they do not have the
protection of the Wagner Act.
92 CONG. REc. 5705-06 (1946) (remarks of Sen. Taft). See 92 CONG. RFc. 5930-31 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Case).
95. 451 U.S. at 410.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 412. Senator Taft offered an amendment for individual damages actions for secondary boycotts similar to the House proposal, but in debate he altered the language to limit damages to claims against unions in order to conform with § 301(b). See 93 CONG. REC. 4900, 504142 (1947). The Court found the debate on this proposal to be critical:
MR. MORSE: [Tihe proposal of the Senator from Ohio would open wide the doors of
the Federal Courts to damage suits against any person who engaged in a strike or attempted to persuade other employees to engage in a strike for one of the prohibited
objectives.
The proposal would very definitely take us back at least 40 years and we would
again have the spectacle of mass suits against employees similar to the infamous Danbury Hatters case. ...
It should be pointed out that the substitute proposal is inconsistent with the present
provision in the bill allowing a union to be sued for breach of contract. . . . Also, section 301 limits recovery to the assets of the union. The substitute allows the attachment
of employees' bank accounts and all their property.
451 U.S. at 413-14.
98. Id. at 414. See Scullin Steel Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1294, 1317-18 (1946); Joseph Dyson &
Sons, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 445, 446-47 (1947).
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express language not only precluding enforcement of judgments
against individuals entered against unions, but excluding individual
strikers from damages liability as well. 9 The Court then dismissed its
prior statement in Hines v. 4nchor Motor Freight, Inc. that "[s]ection
301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees"100 as essentially dictum.' 0 '
After Reis, the question arises of what remedies an employer may
pursue. For example, assume that an employer gives a work assignment to an influential employee who refuses the assignment as undesirable. The employee is then discharged, but the employee's peers
believe the employee was wronged and walk out in support of the discharged employee's reinstatement. Both parties refuse to compromise
0 2
so the employer turns to the union which denies any involvement.1
Legal counsel informs the employer of the Reis decision and that the
union is liable only for strikes it authorizes.10 3 The reality of a wildcat
strike is thus visited upon the employer, who feels cheated of his bargain because he has exchanged his unreviewable discretion in employment matters by agreeing to arbitrate disputes in return for a no-strike
commitment in the negotiations of the collective bargaining agreement.
In Reis, the Court identified a "significant" array of other remedies
available to an employer in such a situation. First, the Court noted an
employer could seek monetary damages when responsibility may be
traced to the union."° Additionally, the Court indicated that an employer may discharge or otherwise discipline an employee who unlawfully walks off the job.'05 The petitioners in Reis had argued that a
damages remedy against individuals furthered industrial peace in its
deterrence of wildcat strikes. In rejecting this contention, the Court
pointed to the alternative of having the union itself discipline its wild99. 451 U.S. at 415.
100. 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976). See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Hines.
101. 451 U.S. at 415 n.17.
102. Fishman & Brown, Union Responsibilityfor Wildcat Strikes, 21 WAYNE L. Rav. 1017,
1017-18 (1975).
103. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 216-18 (1979).
104. 451 U.S. at 416 n.18.
105. Id. See Lakeshore Motor Freight Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Steelhaulers
Local No. 800, 483 F. Supp. 1150, 1154 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (wildcat strikers discharged, and those
allowed to return were rehired as new employees). When discipline is imposed by the company,

the union may then submit the matter to arbitration by filing a grievance concerning the discipline. In such cases, arbitrators have upheld whatever discipline was imposed in the majority of
cases. Handsaker & Handsaker, supra note 1, at 286.
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cat members.10 6 The final remedy suggested by the Court in Reis is
that of injunctive relief against the union for breach of a no-strike provision when the underlying dispute giving rise to the breach is subject
to binding arbitration.0 7 As for injunctive relief against individuals,
the Court found this issue not to be before it, but commented that the
district court judge found that the strike therein commenced over a
labor dispute for which injunctive relief would not be
nonarbitrable
08
available.1
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, while agreeing with the
Court's interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act, does not agree that an
employer has a significant array of other remedies.10 9 Justice Powell
observed that "[i]n reality, more often than not, each of these remedies
[injunction, discharge, union discipline, and damages when the union is
liable] is illusory.""' While noting that the result of this absence of
remedies is a lawless vacuum that leaves such strikes undeterred and
the public interest unprotected,"' Justice Powell concluded, however,
to
that it is within the province of Congress, and not that of the Court,
' 2
authorize a damages remedy against individual wildcat strikers. 1
Chief Justice Burger's dissent, which Justice Rehnquist joined,
Powell's analysis of the remedies actually available
agrees with Justice
'3
to an employer.
These measures, however, are no answer; they may be too little and they surely come too late, after the employer has suffered substantial losses to its business due to a strike that,
under the contract, never should have occurred. In theory,
the employer might mitigate damages by hiring substitute
106. 451 U.S. at 416 n.18. The Landrum-Griffin Act imposes procedural due process on such
union discipline.

No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise
disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof
unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1976).

107. 451 U.S. at 416 n.18. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407
(1976) (issue of strike's legality cannot support injunction); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks

Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1970) (arbitrable issue and equitable relief requirements
necessary for enjoining a strike). For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's application of these injunction principles in Reis, see notes 27-37 supra and accompanying text.

108. 451 U.S. at 416 n.18.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 417 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 420.
Id. at 423.
Id.

113. Id. at 428 n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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workers, but this assumes qualified workers could be found
who would be willing to cross even a "wildcat" picket line. 4
Moreover, the Chief Justice argued that the majority had misinterpreted the scope of section 301. He contended that not only does the
statute not apply on its face, but that the legislative history cited by the
majority does not even address the issue of individual liability for individual conduct undertaken without union involvement."15 According
to Chief Justice Burger, the Court reached its decision purely by relying
on negative implications from the legislative history of section 301.116
The Chief Justice opined that the Court's holding would significantly undermine the usefulness and reliability of the collective bargaining process and would erode the fundamental principle that
individuals are accountable when they breach a contract voluntarily
executed through their agent, the union." 7 If workers can "have their
cake and eat it too" by holding the employer liable for its breaches but
receiving immunity for their own, industrial harmony will be jeopardized as an employer's incentive to enter a collective bargaining agreement is sharply diminished."'
V.

ANALYSIS OF THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO AN EMPLOYER

As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Reis, the express language
of section 301 neither grants nor prohibits a damage remedy against
individuals for wildcat strikes.' '9 The Court was convinced, however,
that the penumbra of section 301(b) as delineated by its legislative history excludes individual strikers from damages liability. 20 Despite this
determination, there is no definite conclusion that can be drawn from
the legislative history to indicate that Congress intended to provide immunity to wildcat strikers for their own breaches of contract. As Chief
Justice Burger observed, "[t]he Court cites various comments by Members of Congress regarding immunity for union members when they act
with union approval. Those remarks do not address the issue before
us-individual liability for individual conduct without union
114. Id. at 428-29 (footnote omitted).

115. Id. at427 n.2.
116. Id. The closest support for the majority interpretation is a remark by Senator Taft, made
during the debate on the predecessor Case bill, stating that employers may fire "wildcat" strikers,

which does not directly touch the issue. See 92 CONG. REc. 5705-06 (1946).
117.
118.
119.
120.

451 U.S. at 427.
Id.
Id.at 415.
Id.
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involvement." 121
In determining congressional intent in enacting section 301, the
Court also placed unwarranted reliance on the rejection by the Senate
and Joint Committee of a House proposal establishing a damages action against individuals engaged in secondary boycotts. 122 The discussion between Senators Morse and Taft, relied on by the Court,1 23 does
not support any clear inference that Congress intended to preclude
damages suits against wildcat strikers; the discussion definitively establishes only that Senator Taft agreed that individual union members acting on behalf of a union in a secondary boycott should not be subject to
individual liability. A secondary boycott is by its nature conducted by
union members on behalf of their union, and Senator Taft's alteration
of his amendment may very well have been done with the sole intent of
conforming to the policy of section 301 that prevents individuals
from
124
union.
the
agent,
their
by
performed
acts
for
liable
being
In the absence of any explicit congressional intention to prohibit
individuals from being liable for their own acts, the majority in Reis
seems to have violated the Court's own admonishment against negative
implications from section 301(b). 25 The legislative history of section
301 is inconclusive at best, and the propriety of the Court's decision
should be judged in its fairness and effectiveness in implementing the
126
national labor policy of promoting industrial peace.
In Reis, the Supreme Court states that there is a significant array
of other remedies available to employers to achieve adherence to collective bargaining agreements. 27 The first remedy suggested, that of
damages from the union when responsibility may be traced to it, is
totally inapplicable to the factual situation in Re/s in which it was specifically alleged that the union was not responsible and could not be
held liable. 2 The Court also suggests that an employer may discharge
121. Id. at 427 n.2 (emphasis in original) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 412. A secondary boycott, which is an unfair labor practice, is the application of

economic pressure upon a person with whom the union has no dispute regarding its own terms of
employment in order to induce that person to cease doing business with another employer with
whom the union does have such a dispute. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 8, at
721-22.
123. 451 U.S. at 413-14. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
124. See Brief for Petitioners at 9-11, Reir.
125. See 451 U.S. at 407.
126. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249 (1970).
127. 451 U.S. at 416 n.18.
128. Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion that strike encouragement by a union is

more often cryptic than explicit. "One court noted that unions sometimes employ 'a nod or a wink
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or discipline an employee who strikes in breach of his contract because

a strike that is in breach of contract is unprotected conduct under the
National Labor Relations Act. 12 9 The effect of such action on indus-

trial peace is questionable; it is easily foreseeable that such a strategy
could result in requiring reinstatement of "martyred" workers as a con-

dition to concluding the strike. If the employer's business is on the line,
he may capitulate and thereby reward a contract breach. 130 Moreover,

wholesale discharges are not practical because an employer cannot terminate a majority of his labor force without crippling production. Selective discharges of union officers are discriminatory and therefore
illegal under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, according to the NLRB, even when the union officer fails to fulfill a con-

tractual requirement to help terminate strikes. 131 Furthermore, an
employer can exercise an individual damage remedy without inflicting

any hardships upon his own business, as a discharge scheme could; the
additional deterrence provided by a damages remedy when the strikers

still have their jobs also provides support for this form of relief for the
employer. 32 It does not seem that an individual damage remedy
would antagonize employees any more than discharge would 133 and,

with a damages remedy, at least a portion of the employer's losses may
be recovered.
The Court inReis also pointed to the alternative of the union itself
disciplining its wildcat members. 34 Practically, a union officer is not

likely to press charges against a union member when the union is not
being harmed. Although it would seem that a union unable to control
its members would lose bargaining power, 135 under the recent decision
or a code

. . .

in place of the word "strike."'" Id. at 418 n.1 (citations omitted) (Powell, J.,

concurring).
129. See NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (workers who strike illegally may be

terminated).
130. Fislman & Brown, supra note 102, at 1022.
131. 451 U.S. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring). See, e.g., Precision Casting Co., 233 N.L.R.B.
183 (1977). Some courts of appeals have disagreed with the Board and have found that union
officers may be held to a higher contractual duty. See Fournelle v. NLRB, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2441, 2447 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Gould, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 730 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 890 (1980); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1979).
132. Note, supra note 50, at 1670.
133. Id. at 1669. Contra Note, LaborLaw-Strikes-IndividualUnion Members Not Liablefor
Breach of ContractualNo-Strike Clause Even When Strike Unauthorizedby Union, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 447, 450-51 (1972) (questioning deterrence value of damages remedy due to likely animosity
from imposition of such).
134. 451 U.S. at 416 n.18.
135. Kozub, supra note 9, at 671.
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in CarbonFuel Co. v. UnitedMine Workers,"3 6 there is no real incentive
to take action against striking employees.
Injunctions in labor disputes are generally prohibited except
within the limited provisions of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 770,137 which provide for injunctive relief only when the
underlying dispute giving rise to the contract breach is subject to binding arbitration. Injunctive relief against the union was the final remedy
suggested by the Court in Reis. The Court implicitly recognized, however, that such relief is not always available, as in Reis wherein the
district court initially denied it.'3 8 Although an injunction was eventually issued in Reis,'3 9 the employer was denied immediate relief from
the strike. Thus, it appears that after the Reis decision the Court's "significant array of other remedies" is actually quite limited.
In addition to the alternative remedies addressed by the Court,
damages for a violation of an injunction may be available in those limited instances in which an injunction may issue.14 0 Of course, these
damages will be paid into the court and not to the employer to compensate his losses;14 ' nevertheless this would appear to have some deterrent
value. In fact, deterrence seems to be one of the strongest arguments
for an individual damage remedy, which was denied in Reis without
full consideration of this aspect.
One commentator has also suggested that a possible avenue for
obtaining a damages remedy may lie in judicial enforcement of an arbitrator's award directing employees to pay damages.' 4 2 Before Boys
Markets, the courts were split on this approach in a somewhat analogous situation involving the enforcement of arbitrator's awards directing employees to return to work.14 3 The Fifth Circuit upheld a
136. 444 U.S. 212, 216-18 (1979) (upholding the right of an employer to sue only when the
union authorized the strike absent a contract clause requiring a higher duty of the union to prevent strikes). See supra note 48 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Railroad Trainmen, 27 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2308, 2311 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (the court determined that it is unrealistic to
expect a union officer to punish a co-worker).
137. 398 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1970). See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
138. 451 U.S. at 416 n.18.
139. For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's application of the Boys Markets principles in Reis,
see notes 27-37 supra and accompanying text. In Re&s, the Supreme Court did not address the
propriety of injunctive relief against individual wildcat strikers, thus leaving the question open.
451 U.S. at 415 n.17.
140. Kozub, supra note 9, at 679.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 683.
143. See Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local
1291, 368 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1966) (sanctioning enforcement of arbitrator's award), rev'd on other
grounds, 389 U.S. 64 (1967). Contra Tanker Serv. Comm., Inc. v. International Org. of Masters,
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district court order enforcing such an arbitrator's award while acknowledging that the court itself had no power to issue the order for an in-

junction.

44

Although these cases dealt with enjoining strike activity in

violation of the no-strike provision of an agreement,145 the analogy to

the enforcement of an arbitrator's award that is beyond the court's authority to issue is valid. Unfortunately, not all arbitrators have con-

strued their powers to encompass the imposition of monetary liability
for instances of union culpability, 146 and there is a lack of authority for
the imposition of damages against individuals for breach of a no-strike
provision. 14 Additionally, to enforce such an award, it would be nec-

essary to include a provision in the collective bargaining agreement
specifying that damages may be awarded when individual employees
engage in a wildcat strike. The employer would then be seeking to

uphold the agreement rather14 than pursuing an independent court action for a money judgment.
The question arises, however, whether such a subject can be le-

gally included in a collective bargaining agreement. In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.," 9 the Supreme Court divided

lawful subjects of bargaining into two categories, mandatory and permissive, based upon section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations

Act,' 50 which requires an employer to bargain collectively with his em-

ployees' representative, and section 8(d), 15 ' which requires good faith
bargaining with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and condi-

tions of employment. Mandatory subjects of bargaining are defined as
Mates & Pilots, 269 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (order to enforce award precluded by § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act); Marine Transp. Lines v. Curran, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2095, 2097
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("The court is being asked to enjoin a work stoppage. This is the reality of the
situation, whatever may be the form of the proceeding.").
144. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 389 F.2d 369,372 (5th Cir. 1968).
145. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1970).
Boys Markets overruled Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962) (held that a suit under
§ 301 to enjoin a work stoppage was barred by § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act). See supra note
27.
146. See Handsaker & Handsaker, supra note 1, at 310-11. Compare PPG Indus., Inc., 51
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 500, 504 (1968) (Vadakin, Arb.) (authority to award monetary damages even
where contract silent on such) with Waycross Sportswear, Inc., 53 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1061, 1062
(1969) (Marshall, Arb.) (no power to award monetary damages).
147. Kozub, supra note 9, at 685.
148. Id.
149. 356 U.S. 342 (1958). For a more detailed discussion of these concepts, see Stark, Preliminary Issues as Permissive Subjects ofBargaining: The Implications of NLRB v. Bartlett-Collins
Co., 16 TULSA L.J. 691, 697-99, 711-19 (1981).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
151. Id. at § 158(d).
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"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,"'I5 2 and
a party may reach an impasse over these demands and attempt to back
them with economic pressure. Furthermore, it is an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain about such a subject. Any other subjects of
bargaining that fall outside section 8(d) are non-statutory; therefore,
there is no duty to bargain. Insisting upon bargaining to agreement
over a permissive subject is considered the equivalent of a refusal to
1 53
bargain and thus is an unfair labor practice.
A clause that subjects a union to liability for damages from the
breach of a no-strike clause has been construed by the NLRB as a permissive bargaining subject' 54 and any damages clause that imposes liability on individuals probably could also be construed as a permissive
bargaining matter. It seems more likely, however, that such a clause
would be illegal due to its inconsistency with the duty of fair representation owed by the union to the employees. 55 While permissive subjects of bargaining may be included in collective bargaining
agreements, illegal subjects cannot be included as they violate the Na56
tional Labor Relations Act.'
Another potential employer remedy not mentioned by the Court
in Reis is a state tort action for tortious interference with an employer's
business.15 7 The question then becomes whether a state tort action is
preempted since section 301 now precludes a federal cause of action
152. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349.
153. See Stark, supra note 149, at 698.
154. Radiator Specialty Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 350 (1963), enforced in part, 336 F.2d 495, 500 (4th
Cir. 1964) (disagreeing with Board and holding that legal-liability clause is mandatory subject);
Hall Tank Co., 214 N.L.R.B. 995, 1000 (1974) (employer's insistence on indemnification clause
from union for damages resulting from work stoppage violated § 8(a)(5)).
155. Galveston Maritime Ass'n, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 899 (1964) (union held to breach its
duty to bargain in good faith under § 8(b)(3) for demanding provision inconsistent with fair representation). Seegeneraly C. MoRRs, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 726-56 (1971 & supplements)
(discussion of union's duty to employees).
156. See, e.g., American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782, 803 (7th Cir.
1951) (closed shop clause held illegal subject). Beyond express violations of the National Labor
Relations Act, the category of illegal subjects is unclear. See C. MORIS, supra note 155, at 43539; Comment, Application ofthe Mandator-PermissiveDichotomy to the Duty to Bargainand UnllateralAction A Review and Reevaluation, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 918, 920-21 & n.15 (1974);
Stark, supra note 149, at 697 n.57.
157. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Brown, 252 F.2d 149, 156 (5th Cir. 1958) (tortious interference
with business relations recognized as cause of action in wildcat strike of railroad employees, who
were not subject to the National Labor Relations Act), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949 (1958). For
criticisms of this case, see Givens, Responsibility ofIndividualEmployeesfor Breachesof o-Strike
Clause, 14 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 595 (1961); Comment, Liability of Employees Under State
Lawfor Damages Causedby Wiidcat Strike: The Brown Case, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 177 (1959). See
generaly Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 9, § 2 (1981) (summary of cases dealing with the interference of
business relations).
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against individual strikers for damages.' 5 8 Although section 301 con-

templates only contract actions against individuals, unions, or employers, a state tort claim, of course, cannot be exercised to evade national
labor policy.' 59
The general rule of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-

mon 160 is applicable to the question of a state tort action for damages
from a wildcat strike:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities
which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the

National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor
practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States

free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of
federal regulation involves too great a danger of conffict be-

tween power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed
by state law. Nor has it mattered whether the States have

acted through laws of broad general application rather than
laws specifically
directed towards the governance of industrial
61
relations.'

In applying a state tort action to wildcat strikers for tortious interference with business relations, the protections of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act are not invoked unless there have been

serious unfair labor practices committed by the employer.

62

More-

over, the Court has recognized exceptions to Garmon when there has
been violent tortious activity, when there is an overriding state interest
158. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, prior to passage of the National Labor Relations Act,
held that a peaceable and orderly strike, apart from contractual liability, is not in violation of the
law. Roddy v. United Mine Workers, 41 Okla. 621, 626, 139 P. 126, 128 (1914) (limited to instances when the object is not to gratify malice or inflict injury upon others, but to secure better
terms of employment for the employees). Oklahoma statutorily protects employees' rights to concerted action against employers in trade disputes in both civil and criminal cases in peaceable and
legitimate endeavors. See Lair v. State, 316 P.2d 225, 236 (Okla. 1957) (construing statute now at
OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 166 (1981)). This statute, however, expressly excludes acts of force or violence. Id. It could therefore be inferred that an action in tort against wildcat strikers may be valid
in Oklahoma. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that local common law
actions such as injunctions, libel, and tort are not necessarily preempted by federal law. See, e.g.,
Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297
(1971).
159. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249 (1962).
160. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
161. Id. at 244. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 138-41 (1976) (state regulation of overtime preempted although neither § 7 nor § 8 applied).
162. See Lincoln Tech. Inst., Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 1980-81 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 18,115
(May 27, 1981) (discharge of employees for breach of no-strike clause justified).
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deeply rooted in a local feeling of responsibility, and when there is little
risk of interference with the effective administration of national labor
policy. 163 Although the Court has not specifically addressed the status
of a state tort action for tortious interference with business relations
against a wildcat striker since Reis, such an action is arguably not preempted due to the state's interest in the welfare of its citizens. 164 The
assertion of state jurisdiction does not create any risk of violating pro165
as a wildcat strike is not a lawful means of ecotected labor activity
66
sanction.'
nomic
The final potential remedy available to an employer is prevention
of a wildcat strike. This depends in considerable measure on improved
communication so that the tensions which frequently precipitate a
wildcat strike will not mount. Ideally, workers should accept the griev67
ance procedures already available to deal with disputes.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Even if the Court in Reis is correct in concluding that the legislative history of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act precludes a damages remedy against individual wildcat strikers, which
seems questionable, 68 the alternative remedies suggested by the Court
as available to the employer are severely limited, if not entirely illusory.' 69 Furthermore, the future validity of the additional remedies
raised herein-monetary relief through an arbitrator's award or a state
tort action-is uncertain. 17 As the Supreme Court has effectively left
the employer without a remedy for wildcat strikes, which will likely be
disruptive to industrial harmony since wildcat strikes are left undeterred, congressional consideration of damages against wildcat strikers is
needed. A no-strike obligation, express or implied, is usually considered the quid pro quo of an undertaking by the employer to submit to
163. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 297-301
(1977). See generally Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST.
L.J. 277 (1980) (analyzing the Garmon rule and its exemptions).
164. Cf. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 297-301

(1977) (state tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress not preempted).
165. Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180

(1978) (enforcement of state trespass laws against picketing not preempted).
166. Cf. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 138-41 (1976) (state regulation of failure to agree to overtime as
unfair practice preempted as union control of overtime is lawful economic weapon).
167. See Handsaker & Handsaker, supra note 1, at 321.
168. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 140-66 and accompanying text.
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arbitration. Indeed, the purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide
a mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes without resort to
strikes. However, the incentive for an employer to negotiate such
measures is sharply dissipated by Reis.
Moreover, the Reis decision, in conjunction with the Supreme
Court's decision in Carbon FuelCo. v. UnitedMine Workers,' 7 ' creates
new concerns for the parties to a collective bargaining agreement.
With the foreclosure of a section 301 damages action against wildcat
strikers along with the limitation of liability for the breach of a nostrike clause for a local or parent union to the instigation, support, ratification, or encouragement of the strike, 1 72 an employer's damages are
without remedy, unless a contract is artfully drafted for his protection.
A contractual provision requiring that a union intervene and terminate
a wildcat strike could be the basis for a damages action.
While a no-strike clause is a mandatory subject of bargaining, 73 a
clause subjecting a union to legal liability for violation of a no-strike
clause is a permissive matter.' 74 Moreover, the possibility of holding a
local union liable is of little value because a local is often judgmentproof.' 75 Ideally, an employer would have a no-strike clause imposing
on the parent union a duty to terminate wildcat strikes. In negotiating
such a clause, however, an employer must be aware that the only required parties to a collective bargaining agreement are the employer
and the certified bargaining representative(s) of the company.' 76 If the
parent union is not a certified representative, the negotiation of the status of the parent union as a party is a permissive subject of bargaining.
Insistence to the point of impasse on signing a union entity other than
one certified would be an unfair labor practice. Most assuredly, an employer is treading on shifting sands in any attempt to remedy his losses
from a wildcat strike.
PaulaE. Pyron
171. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
172. Id. at 218.

173. C. MORRIS, supra note 155, at 410. See Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948).
174. C. MORRIS, supra note 155, at 431. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.

175. Reis, 451 U.S. at 423 n.10 (Powell, J., concurring).
176. C. MORRIS, supra note 155, at 428. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342, 350 (1958) (a clause recognizing additional parties to a contract is a permissive
subject of bargaining).
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